BGH: FRAND objection fails due to lack of willingness to license

In its ruling of January 27, 2026 (KZR 10/25), the Cartel Senate of the Federal Court of Justice upheld a patent infringement action arising from standard-essential patents (SEP) and rejected the defendant’s antitrust compulsory license objection / FRAND objection. The pivotal point was no longer the patent infringement (which was no longer in dispute in the appeal proceedings), but solely the question of whether the assertion of the injunctive relief is barred due to an abuse of a dominant market position within the meaning of Art. 102 TFEU.

Facts in brief: SEP, FRAND declaration, failed negotiations

The plaintiff is the patent holder of several patents for the coding of audio signals, the teaching of which has been incorporated into mobile radio standards (SEP). The plaintiff had declared to the standardization organization that it was willing to license the patents on FRAND terms (“fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”). The defendant sold standard-compliant mobile telephones.

License negotiations between the parties went on for years without a conclusion. The plaintiff sued for injunctive relief, among other things. The defendant countered: The plaintiff was abusing its market power (mediated by SEP) and was therefore not allowed to enforce the injunctive relief (Art. 102 TFEU).

Lower courts: Munich Regional Court I (25.05.2022 – 7 O 14091/19) and Munich Higher Regional Court (20.03.2025 – 6 U 3824/22 Kart) ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

Key statement of the BGH: Injunction remains possible if the opponent is not seriously willing to license

The BGH adheres to the line developed from the ECJ decision Huawei/ZTE (C-170/13) and its own case law on FRAND Objection I / II: Art. 102 TFEU does not prevent an SEP holder from judicial enforcement merely because a license dispute exists – rather, the decisive factor is whether the conduct of the party against whom a claim is made indicates a serious willingness to license (willingness to license).

In the specific case, the BGH considered a lack of willingness to license to be proven, among other things, because the defendant

• responded to the plaintiff’s license offer only after a considerable delay,
• was also late in responding to the offer of a confidentiality agreement (as a prerequisite for the disclosure of license agreements already concluded),
• and during the long negotiations only provided a security that was significantly lower than what would have resulted even from the defendant’s own license offers.

The antitrust compulsory license objection was therefore unsuccessful; the appeal was dismissed.

No ECJ referral: no rigid sequence of steps from Art. 102 TFEU

The procedural statement is also noteworthy: The BGH did not consider a referral pursuant to Art. 267 (3) TFEU to be necessary. Reasoning: According to Huawei/ZTE, the circumstances of the individual case should be taken into account; Union law does not prescribe a fixed sequence of procedural steps that must be strictly adhered to in every case.

Classification: What the ruling means in practice for FRAND negotiations

The decision is stringently in line with the recent line of the Cartel Senate, according to which the “FRAND defense” must not be reduced to formal lip service, but requires consistent, swift and resilient negotiation behavior. Since FRAND Objection I (KZR 36/17) and FRAND Objection II (KZR 35/17), this has been the central dogmatic guardrail: the alleged infringer must prove its willingness to license through actual conduct.

In practice, this means above all

1) Timing is substance, not formality.
Delays in responding to offers (incl. NDA/confidentiality) can be seen as an indication of unwillingness to license.

2) Security/performance obligations are taken seriously.
If you put figures in the room yourself, you have to be measured against them – in any case, security below your own offer regularly has a toxic effect in a dispute.

3) The FRAND objection remains a high-risk instrument.
Especially in the SEP context, the antitrust “block” of the injunction claim is not easily opened. This is also in line with the case law of the courts, which in many constellations focuses heavily on the overall conduct of the license seeker.

Conclusion

In the SEP/FRAND complex, the abstract FRAND dogma is often less decisive than the negotiating discipline. The antitrust compulsory license objection remains possible, but fails if the conduct of the license seeker does not appear to be a serious and consistent willingness to license.

Author: Marian Härtel

Marian Härtel ist Rechtsanwalt und Fachanwalt für IT-Recht mit einer über 25-jährigen Erfahrung als Unternehmer und Berater in den Bereichen Games, E-Sport, Blockchain, SaaS und Künstliche Intelligenz. Seine Beratungsschwerpunkte umfassen neben dem IT-Recht insbesondere das Urheberrecht, Medienrecht sowie Wettbewerbsrecht. Er betreut schwerpunktmäßig Start-ups, Agenturen und Influencer, die er in strategischen Fragen, komplexen Vertragsangelegenheiten sowie bei Investitionsprojekten begleitet. Dabei zeichnet sich seine Beratung durch einen interdisziplinären Ansatz aus, der juristische Expertise und langjährige unternehmerische Erfahrung miteinander verbindet. Ziel seiner Tätigkeit ist stets, Mandanten praxisorientierte Lösungen anzubieten und rechtlich fundierte Unterstützung bei der Umsetzung innovativer Geschäftsmodelle zu gewährleisten.